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Japanese Nationalism

by

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requirements for the degree of

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ABSTRACT

This thesis addresses the phenomenon of Japanese nationalism, its changing place in Japanese life, and its influence on Japan's international relations. This study uses a theoretical-psychological approach to nationalism. After tracing the historical development of nationalist thought beginning in Tokugawa Japan, current social trends in the areas of politics, economics, women and family, and youth and education are examined to determine if the requisite qualities of nationalism are present in modern Japan to portend an eventual return to an ultra form of nationalism. The thesis concludes that traditional nationalist thought remains a vital part of Japanese thinking; and, concerning national security implications for the United States, the U.S. should not forcefully pressure Japan in the areas of trade and security issues. If U.S. policy is devoid of cultural sensitivity, Japan may exercise its options in unilateral defense buildup and trade preferences.

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I. INTRODUCTION

This thesis will address the phenomenon of Japanese nationalism, its changing place in Japanese life, and its influence on Japan's international relations.

Japanese nationalism has always had dynamic qualities which have deeply affected the course of Japanese interaction with other sovereign states. This study was undertaken because Japanese nationalism, or more precisely the presence of certain unique qualities found therein, continues to exert influence on contemporary Japan. Furthermore, the historical precedent found in prewar Japan for an ultra or extreme manifestation of nationalist sentiment justifies reexamination of contemporary Japan's national soul.

Takeshi Umehara, head of the Japanology Institute in Kyoto, feels that the prewar idea, "In him, (the emperor) was expressed the wholeness of the people," is a concept to be exported in the 1980s. He asserts, "A principle for the whole world will be born from our historical spirit, the way of the Emperor must be applied to all countries."¹ At a time when Japan has assumed a leading economic role in the

¹ Ian Buruma, "A New Japanese Nationalism," The New York Times Magazine, (April 12, 1987): 29.

world and, beginning under the direction of former Prime Minister Nakasone, is developing a political presence, one wonders if a cycle of nationalism and ultranationalism could be repeated. The question is whether there is present in modern Japan the requisite qualities of nationalism to portend an eventual return to the Yamato-style state as a driving force in Japan's international relations.

Masao Maruyama, in a 1946 essay, wrote, "Ultrnationalism succeeded in spreading a many-layered, though invisible, net over the Japanese people, and even today, they have not really freed themselves from its hold."² The West and its influence twice made decisive impacts on Japan. The first was initiated by US Commodore Matthew C. Perry's "black ships" in 1853. Within a single generation, Japan had become a leading world industrial power, with ultranationalism the dominant political theme. The second impact was by General Douglas MacArthur and the US Occupation. Once again, Japan, to the amazement of the world, climbed to the top of the industrial ladder. At what point could nationalist sentiment once again reach frenzied levels and history be repeated.

In defining nationalism, no simple definition exists. It is a complex phenomenon that is formed in relation to

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Masao Maruyama, Thought and Behavior in Modern Japanese Politics, expanded ed., (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 1969), p. 150.

historical conditions and the special social structure of any given country. There are many different schools of thought concerning nationalism. Hans Kohn defines nationalism as "first and foremost a state of mind, an act of consciousness . . . the individual's identification of himself with the 'we-group' to which he gives supreme loyalty."³ To Carlton J. H. Hayes, nationalism is "a fusion of patriotism with a consciousness of nationality." It is a product combining "a common language (or closely related dialects) and . . . a community of historical traditions."⁴ In a less traditional approach, Karl W. Deutsch used communications theory and cybernetics in his definition of nationalism. He believed that the test of nationality was the ability of a people to communicate more effectively with each other than with outsiders.⁵

Taking into consideration Japan's society and history, the definition of nationalism most appropriate for this thesis follows:

Nationalism is a condition of mind, feeling, or sentiment of a group of people living in a well-defined geographical area, speaking a common language, possessing a literature in which the aspirations of the

3

Hans Kohn, Nationalism: Its Meaning and History, (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Co., 1965), p. 27.

4

Carlton J. H. Hayes, Essays on Nationalism, (New York: Russell & Russell, 1966), pp. 1-28.

5

Louis L. Synder, The Dynamics of Nationalism, (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1964), p. 1.

nation have been expressed, being attached to common traditions, and, in some cases, having a common religion.⁶

In looking at the uniqueness of Japanese nationalism, several basic conditions exist. Japan's early national consciousness largely depended on its isolation from its neighbors. This awareness of geographical isolation can be seen in the earliest histories which describe Japan's divine origins. The belief in divine protection was further enforced when the Mongol invasion fleet in the 13th Century was destroyed by a typhoon. To the Japanese, this was the "divine wind" (kamikaze) which protected the land of the gods from foreign invaders. This incident contributed to the belief that Japan was sacred and inviolable. This geographical isolation strengthened in the Japanese a sense of historical continuity and cultural unity.

Another element in Japanese nationalism is the belief in a common racial descent; the Japanese are one of the most racially homogeneous people in the world. The majority of the early inhabitants of Japan came to the islands from Korea and other areas on the Asian mainland, including South China. The Japanese are predominantly Mongoloid in physical type. The exceptions are the modern Ainu, mainly in Hokkaido, who are racially descended from early Caucasoid

6

Delmer M. Brown, Nationalism in Japan, (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1955), pp. 1-15.

peoples of northern Asia and whose trait of "hairiness" has contributed to the modern Japanese physical characteristic of a relatively greater amount of body hair as compared with other Asians.

The existence of a common language is essential in communicating and spreading nationalism. The several dialects of Japanese do not constitute a barrier. The fact that Japanese is not spoken in other parts of the world has contributed to their feeling of uniqueness, a concept inseparable from Japanese nationalism. Japan's long history of poetic, prose, historical, and dramatic literature has been instrumental in maintaining a deep awareness of their past.

Common and unique religious beliefs were invaluable in the development of nationalism. The fervor of modern Japanese nationalism can be traced to the institution of emperor. The basic Shinto teaching of divine ancestry shaped the attitudes toward emperor and legitimized the authority of the imperial house to rule. According to mythology, Japan was created by two primeval deities, Izanagi and Izanami, whose offspring, the Sun Goddess Amaterasu, became the protector and ruler of the land. The grandson of Amaterasu, Ninigi no Mikoto, founded a line of imperial rulers destined to govern eternally in Amaterasu's name.

In order to test or measure these basic elements to determine if nationalism is "ultra" or "extreme," it is necessary to state several tentative perceptions. First, it is an external evaluator who must label a country or period of a nation's history as nationalistic or ultranationalistic. That is, it is not a self-assessment rendered until after the fact; a patriot does not see himself as acting beyond the range or limits of what is ordinary or proper. A good example of this is seen in Oliver North, the US Marine lieutenant colonel of Iran-Contra fame. According to some views, he did not look at his actions as either moral or immoral, but only as "good for his country."

Nationalism is not measurable. It cannot be reduced to a numerical index for scientific discussion. However, we need to differentiate between nationalism that is more or less common to all modern nation-states and the "ultra" form of nationalism. The most obvious answer is the presence of expansionist, militarist tendencies. A country lacking sufficient and sustainable military projection has no means to validate empire building, sustain an ultranationalist force or even defend an isolationist policy within its own sovereign borders. This leads to the third and final perception.

Japan placed great emphasis on power. Japanese ultranationalism involved both spiritual authority and

political power. The standard according to which the nation's actions were judged as right or wrong laid within itself, in the "national polity." What the nation did, within or beyond its borders, was not subject to any moral code that superceded the nation. Although a country engaged in international exchange, be it political or economic, cannot afford dramatic shifts in national goals, the apparently radical subordination of world good to national good becomes discernible. An example of this is seen in a passage from The Way of the Subject:

Our country's determination and military strength made [the principal Allied powers] unable to impose any sanctions whatsoever. When Japan seceded, the true nature of the League [of Nations] was revealed to the world. In autumn of the same year Germany followed our example and seceded, and later Italy took advantage of the Abyssinian question to announce its secession also, so that the League became nothing but an empty name. Thus since the autumn of 1931 our country made great strides in the vanguard of the forces struggling for world renovation.⁷

Japan openly scorned the fact that the League was powerless to imposed sanctions.

Finally, there have been many approaches to the study of Japanese nationalism. In the past, many studies used the traditional approach of such writers as Hayes and Kohn. Their approach was one of the intellectual historian and has been considered too limited when viewing the phenomenon of

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Maruyama, Thought and Behavior in Modern Japanese Politics, p. 10.

modern nationalism. Kohn's definition as a "state of mind" does not take into adequate account social change in which large numbers of people of all social classes are psychologically integrated into and positively identify with the nation-state.⁸

Ruth Benedict's belief that the traditional structure of group life provided the basis for modern nationalism is representative of the structural approach that is seen in some writings. This approach identified in traditional social groups certain structural features and supporting ethics that were considered necessary in the development of nationalism. Benedict stressed the ethics of on (indebtedness resulting from the bestowal of a favor by a superior on an inferior; repaid with loyalty, obedience, and service) and giri (social obligation) and the Japanese "confidence in hierarchy."⁹ The structural approach emphasized that the growth of national loyalty did not depend upon the destruction of local and regional ties as was used in describing nationalism in the early Meiji period.

8

Hayes, Essays on Nationalism, pp. 1-28.

9

Kenneth B. Pyle, "Some Recent Approaches to Japanese Nationalism," in Modern Japan: An Interpretive Anthology, ed. Irwin Scheiner, (New York: MacMillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1974), pp. 122-134.

The most common approach to the study of Japanese nationalism has been based on "interest theory," in which nationalist doctrine is viewed as an ideological weapon used by the elite, government and dominant social groups, to further their power.¹⁰ This interest theory is particularly applicable to the 20th century when the government used education, the media, and the army to foster the growth of nationalism.

A theoretical-psychological approach to nationalism, as seen in the writings of Masao Maruyama,¹¹ will be used in this thesis. Current social trends in the areas of politics, economics, women and family and youth and education will be first reviewed and then analyzed to determine what role, if any, traditional/contemporary thought plays in shaping the character of nationalism today. My hypothesis is that these trends will strengthen the role of nationalism in the formation of Japan's national security policies.

The history section will analyze the origin and development of nationalist "thought" in Japan as a necessary foundation for studying present social conditions. The paper will conclude with an analysis of how nationalistic tendencies are, or are not, reflected in today's society.

¹⁰

Ibid.

¹¹

Maruyama, Thought and Behavior in Modern Japanese Politics.

II. HISTORY OF JAPANESE NATIONALISM

The beginning of what was to become modern nationalism is discernible as far back into history as the Tokugawa period. It is from this point that the dynamic nationalist forces will be traced, focusing on concepts that have permeated Japanese society and thought, such as kokutai (national essence; what it means to be Japanese) and Shintoism, showing how they influenced foreign policy and suggesting that they may exert comparable influence on Japan's policies in the future.

A. TOKUGAWA JAPAN

The Tokugawa period in Japan was marked by the rise of intellectual currents which began the first distinct phase in the growth of national consciousness. Of particular importance was the new emphasis upon kokutai or "what it means to be Japanese"; the beginnings of the movement can be detected in the writings of the earliest 17th century Confucian scholars. When the first Portuguese came ashore, Japan was torn by civil war. Within 50 years, the country was under the control of Hideyoshi. The Tokugawa political and social system was put together under Ieyasu, the first "Shogun." The military regime, or bakufu, came to advocate in the first half of the 17th century that soldiers devote

their energies to scholarship. It was from this scholastic endeavor that intellectual movements emerged, arousing a deeper appreciation for Japan's heritage. It is here, in Tokugawa Japan, that modern Japanese nationalism is rooted.

Tokugawa Japan was a feudal society where the Tokugawa military regime exerted direct and indirect control throughout the three islands of Honshu, Kyushu and Shikoku. The shogun controlled Japan while the emperor and his court led a cloistered life in Kyoto, far from the circle of political control and power. The shogunate and imperial court existed as dual systems with the emperor as sometimes nominal sovereign and the shogun as ruler. Although the shogunate possessed the actual power, it never dared (or needed) to challenge the emperor's inalienable right to reign. Through isolation, the Tokugawa government attempted to seal Japan from western influence and prevent any disruption of the feudal atmosphere. Consequently, nationalistic thought initially developed in response to outside forces, and was a product of tensions within Japanese society. During the late 17th and early 18th centuries, nationalism materialized in the form of kokutai (the national essence; what it means to be Japanese) discussions, reactions against official Confucianism, classical studies and the Son-no or Revere the Emperor

Movement and was limited for the most part to samurai
intellectuals.¹²

The center of power rested on the great ie¹³ (house, family) of the Tokugawa family, with the seat of the government in Edo. Three branches of the Tokugawa family, the Owari, Kii, and Mito, controlled a domain which covered almost a quarter of the country, including the main cities of Edo, Osaka, and Kyoto. The remaining three-quarters of Japan was controlled by daimyo or feudal lords.

Below the shogun and daimyo were the samurai who owed allegiance to their lords. They were paid in rice-stipends, in actuality becoming a parasitic class. Near the end of the Tokugawa period, when rice stipends were cut by impoverished daimyo, the less disciplined became ronin, literally "wandering men," breaking their allegiance to the daimyo. Many of these ronin studied Western languages and science, becoming part of the intellectual force behind the opening of Japan and ardent supporters of the Restoration. In their attack upon the bakufu, they strove to rouse Japan to national consciousness. From this group came the slogan "Revere the Emperor, Expel the Barbarian" (Son-no Jo-i). The intellectuals who wanted to adopt Western methods in

¹²

Brown, Nationalism in Japan, p. 61.

¹³

Seizaburo Sato, "Analysis of Japan's Modernization," The Japan Echo, Vol III, 2 (Summer 1976): 72.

defense against the West began to listen to the scholars of Dutch learning or rangakusha. Not only did these scholars advocate learning the techniques of making guns and building ships, but they stressed the importance of appreciating the strength of Western powers. In fact, Shozan Sakuma, one of the prominent Dutch scholars, was imprisoned for his part in encouraging a student, Shoin Yoshida, to stow away on one of Perry's ships in order to learn about the West firsthand. In his most famous book, Reflections on My Errors, he unequivocally stated the policy he favored, which was eventually adopted by the leaders of the Restoration of 1868. He wrote:

It is inevitable that "if we know neither the enemy nor ourselves, we shall be defeated in every battle." Even if we knew both the enemy and ourselves, at the present time we should still not speak of fighting. Only after we have mastered everything that the enemy can do well, without losing the abilities we already have, can we begin to speak of that.¹⁴

The Tokugawa government propounded and left as its heritage to modern Japan a view of society which was one of fixed stratification: a hierarchy of samurai, farmer, artisan, and merchant.¹⁵ The merchant class, in theory, was at the bottom of the social scale; the samurai were looked upon as the government's protection and the peasants were its revenue (rice was the main source of revenue).

¹⁴Ibid., p. 74.

¹⁵

Brown, Nationalism in Japan, p. 77.

However, the government, the daimyo and samurai classes, became increasingly dependent upon the merchant class as the economy gradually shifted from one of rice to one of money. By the time the bakufu reached its 200th year of rule, it had confronted such disasters as earthquakes, floods, and famines. Rice riots broke out and often were lead by ronin. Suppression of such revolts became more and more difficult for the government. In this period of growing confusion, the western menace, in the form of Commodore Perry, and the Tokugawa government's inability to deal with it, was the decisive factor in the downfall of the bakufu.¹⁶

The first Tokugawa shogun officially sanctioned Confucianism -- one of his main concerns was to instill loyalty to his government. Confucian teaching emphasized the five fundamental human relationships. In Tokugawa Japan, the first of these relationships was "sovereign-subject" which was centered around the concepts of righteousness and duty.

With the shogun's approval, Razan Hayashi (1583-1657), the most outstanding Confucianist in Japan at that time, was to establish the neo-Confucian philosophy of Chu Hsi as the norm for samurai education.¹⁷ Chu Hsi lived about 1500

¹⁶ W. G. Beasley, The Modern History of Japan, 2nd ed. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973), p. 56.

¹⁷ David Magarey Earl, Emperor and Nation in Japan, (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1964), p. 19.

years after Confucius, and in his Confucian philosophy, he stressed the principle of fulfilling one's duty or obligation. It demanded a recognition of one's proper station or rank and a complete dedication to meeting the requirements connected with it. Such a code, knowing one's place and fulfilling one's obligation to his sovereign lord, was perfectly designed to meet the demands of the new lord-and-vassal feudal system. The Japanese name for the philosophy of Chu Hsi was shushigaku. Education according to shushigaku became the norm for upper-class samurai in Tokugawa Japan. However, the road ahead for shushigaku was not an easy one; the Tokugawa period was characterized by clashes between Chinese thought and Japanese tradition.

In the beginning, Confucianism and Shinto were accepted by many simultaneously. Eventually, however, Confucianism was viewed more and more as a foreign element in society. Having grown intellectually through contacts with China, the Japanese gradually began to reassert a spirit of cultural independence. Japan, in effect, had become a "cultured" society with its own political and social institutions uniquely Japanese. Japan had reached a state of intellectual maturity and was ready to pursue an individual course. As a result, Japan increasingly began to feel it was impossible to apply Chinese thinking to Japan.

Among the early Tokugawa writers who began to question the justification for relying solely on Chinese example,

Soko Yamaga was instrumental in awakening a sense of love for country and pride in the uniqueness of Japan. A ronin by origin and a master of military science, his tactics and strategy were taught up to the end of Tokugawa. Using his knowledge of Confucianism, Japanese tradition, and military science, he created a new theory for bushido, the "Way of the Warrior."¹⁸ The main emphasis in his writings on bushido was that nothing was more important for the samurai than "duty." Yamaga replaced the ideal of the "superior man" with that of the "heroic man." Through his clarification of the principles of bushido, he gave new meaning to the concepts of loyalty and duty.

Ansai Yamazaki was critical in shaping Japanese thought in the Tokugawa period. He was both a Confucianist and a Shinto scholar; he was renowned for his fervent patriotism. He developed an important school of Confucian Shinto, which moved away from Confucianism into Shinto thought. The resultant philosophy was called Suika Shinto;¹⁹ "Suika" was Yamazaki's Shinto name. Its mystical and nonrational approach to the emperor stimulated loyalty. He tried to establish a stronger ethical and philosophical support of

¹⁸

Ibid., p. 40.

¹⁹

Ibid., p. 54.

Shintoism that was more in line with the kokugaku movement,²⁰ which was the drive to learn more about Japan's past.

Yamazaki's personal disciples and followers composed a school of thought known as the Kimon school.²¹ The Kimon school retained the Confucian framework but with a Japanese application. It was Yamazaki's teachings, and those of his prominent students, concerning loyalty to the imperial household that came to be a powerful motivating force behind the "Revere the Emperor" movement.²² This can best be seen in Asami Keisai's Seiken Igen (Eternal Messages of Sacrificial Dedication). The message in this book was how important it was to uphold the ideal of taigi or supreme duty (knowing one's place and fulfilling one's obligation of rendering loyal service to the sovereign). This eventually became one of the major texts of the Meiji restoration ideology. Keisai not only wanted to emphasize sacrifice and devotion, but also wanted to strengthen the feeling of loyalty to the imperial house.

Kokugaku, or national learning, developed as a reaction against the dominating Chinese classics and philosophy and was the next step beyond Keisai and Suika Shinto. Kokugaku

²⁰

Brown, Nationalism in Japan, p. 54.

²¹

The word "Kimon" is a two-character abbreviation connoting "Disciples (or School) of Yamazaki Ansai."

²²

Brown, Nationalism in Japan, p. 54.

was created by the efforts of four scholars over a span of about 150 years, beginning in the 18th century. It was based on the assertion that the Japanese character was naturally pure, and required the removal of foreign influences to once again shine forth in its own splendor.

It was intended as a moral and spiritual movement for the reform of the national character and included study of the position of the emperor, the organization of the state,²³ and the duties of the subjects. Instilled in the Japanese was the belief that the nation formed one indivisible unit, the bakufu being set up for convenience in administration. As Shinto belief seemingly became more purified, reverence for the emperor became stronger; as Japan's unique character was stressed, national consciousness grew. With the growth in national consciousness, emperor-directed loyalty began to broaden into national patriotism.

Mitogaku (Mito school) developed entirely independent of kokugaku. The two school both asserted that the ideal pattern of government, ethics, and morality were the peculiar possession of Japan. The actual difference was in the way each school viewed the emperor and nation. Mitogaku emphasized the historical aspect and kokugaku, the religious. The Mito school produced the final stage of Tokugawa thinking on emperor and nation. Mito's

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Earl, Emperor and Nation in Japan, p. 236.

contribution was in deepening the interest in Japanese culture and thereby paving the way for the study of classical subjects and for the more outspoken anti-foreign feelings of the 18th and 19th centuries. From this school of thought came the Dai Nihon Shi or Great History of Japan, which was basically completed in 1720 under the supervision of Chu Shun-shui and was written with the purpose of fostering loyalty to the emperor.²⁴ By giving scholarly sanction to the Sun Goddess Amaterasu and Three Sacred Treasures myth, the Dai Nihon Shi significantly contributed to the amalgamation of Shinto belief and national patriotism. This work was not intended to attack the bakufu. In the concept of state, the emperor was supreme and the shogun was his loyal minister. However, other works were beginning to challenge the authority of the bakufu.

Yasushi Aizawa, one of the most eminent scholars of Mito, was renowned for his work, Shinron, (New Proposals),²⁵ which eventually outranked even the Dai Nihon Shi. It was the pioneer work on the theory of kokutai (national essence) and detailed a carefully devised program for unifying and strengthening the nation. It called for the Emperor to assert his authority as the natural, divinely ordained leader of the nation.

²⁴

Ibid., p. 83.

²⁵

Ibid., p. 91.

The word kokutai was found in Chinese documents long before it was used in Japan; the Chinese meaning was organ of the state or organization of the state. The Japanese concept of the unique characteristics of Japan had long existed even though no specific term was used to express it. Kokutai, in its deepest sense, came to indicate an inner essence or mystical force residing in the Japanese nation as a result of Amaterasu's shinchoku (divine decree)²⁶ --from this background the Japanese developed characteristics distinct from those of other lands. It can also be used to refer to the outward manifestation of those unique characteristics or could simply be used to convey national prestige or "face." David M. Earl explained kokutai thought as:

... Japan is a patriarchal state in which everyone is related and the imperial house is the main or head family. The emperor is the supreme father, and loyalty to him, or patriotism, becomes the highest form of Filial Piety. Because of the command of Amaterasu, this structure is both sacred and eternal; compliance with its requirements is the obligation and deepest wish of every Japanese.²⁷

Aizawa vocalized the growing preoccupation with the danger of foreign aggression and the need to contain it in

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The word shinchoku literally means any divine decree, promise, or oracle. In the Tokugawa period, shinchoku came to refer almost exclusively to Amaterasu's promise to her grandson, Ninigi, that the line of his descendants, and the imperial throne of Japan, would be coeval with heaven and earth.

27

Earl, Emperor and Nation in Japan, p. 236.

order to preserve the essential nature of the "Land of the Gods." In the first decades of the 19th century, a general debate was taking place among administrators and educators over the national policy issue of "closed country" versus "open country." It soon came to be that "open country" could be equated with "support the bakufu" and "closed country" was connected with "revere the emperor". A circle of scholars within Japan were quick to point out that "open country" and building Japan's international authority and prestige would be the only policy possible in line with Japan's history and kokutai. Jo-i (expel the barbarian) replaced the theory of closed country. Based on a fear that the moral fiber of the people was weakening, the goal of jo-i was the preservation of kokutai, both spiritually and materially.²⁸ Jo-i, like son-no (revere the emperor), became closely related to kokutai and developed into an integral part of loyal and patriotic attitudes--"son-no jo-i."

After 1865, the slogan "Revere the Emperor! Expel the barbarians!" was gradually replaced by another one, "Rich country--Strong army!" The leaders were gradually shifting from antiforeignism to reform.

28

Louis L. Snyder, A New Nationalism, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1968), pp. 243-253.

B. THE SPIRIT OF MEIJI

In 1868, a group within Japan's military aristocracy assumed power and liquidated the Tokugawa system. They confronted the challenge of Western power by building a new political and social order inspired by their Western counterpart. The leaders of this revolutionary program abolished all rights of the military aristocracy, to which they had belonged. Restrictions on society which were lifted included the traditional class distinctions of occupation, residence, food, and dress; the warrior's monopoly of office, his exclusive right to bear arms, and his privileged education were all liquidated. A highly centralized government, powerful enough to deal with the West, was formed.²⁹

The new government employed foreign engineers, technicians, and teachers. Education was revised to accommodate the demands of an industrial society, classical studies were replaced by the study of Western languages, and scientific and technical training. Although the Meiji leadership saved Japan from the type of national disaster that other Asian countries experienced in their confrontation with the West, it also exacted high costs in terms of historical and cultural dislocation. Frustrations arose from a sense of inferiority to the West, rooted in the

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Sato, "Analysis of Japan's Modernization," p. 77.

early diplomatic weaknesses and cultural borrowing. The result was an upsurge of nationalism and the birth of militarism. Specifically, there was a reaction against Western ways and a reawakening of interest in Japan. This reaction meant more definite identification with the nation and a sharper distinction between that which was Japanese and that which was not Japanese. In addition, the building of a modern army gave the Japanese a new sense of confidence. In the face of earlier dangers there had been a helpless feeling that resistance would prove disastrous. However, the Japanese soon came to insist not only upon international justice but also upon proving, by military action, that Japan was entitled to her "proper place" among the nations of the world.

The first generation of Meiji, the generation that grew up amid the revolutionary social and cultural change, was burdened with the task of finding a way to preserve their identity as Japanese in the radical atmosphere of Westernization. They grew up in a social order that was still evolving, where innovation and creativity were highly prized. There developed among this generation a self-awareness and feeling of identity with a shared feeling

that the adult generation was not capable of contributing to the changing society.

This first generation of youth had received traditional, Confucian training at home and in private academies; and then, in the newly established schools under Meiji, were taught by Western teachers new Western ideas--old and new values were conflicting and confusing. Traditionally, education had started at home with instruction in the family's work and in the conduct of life, with formal schooling simply extending that instruction. In Meiji Japan, the new educational system became the transmitter of cultural and social revolution. The emphasis in education was on preparing for occupations in an industrial society, devaluing the family's role in vocational training. Success depended on the mastery of such subjects as mechanical engineering, French, law, and English conversation.

Shoin Yoshida was the person most closely associated with the progressive policy of the Meiji government. From among his students came some of the most influential leaders of Meiji, including Prince Ito (author of the first constitution) and Prince Yamagata (founder of the modern Japanese army). Yoshida emphasized the necessity of achieving greater unity and adopting extensive military, economic, and educational reforms to assure national independence and growth. "Rich country--Strong army" became the slogan of the Meiji era, replacing the "Revere the

Emperor, Expel the barbarian" one of the late Tokugawa
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period.

The new government sought to strengthen itself by deliberately fostering a sense of belonging to the nation-- this was one of the driving forces behind the entire Meiji reform program. The period between 1868 and 1887 was a distinct period in the development of nationalism. Building national strength and solidarity was the first priority. The government took several steps to foster allegiances to the national level, including the establishment of modern communications, a national conscript army, and a national education system. In establishing a communications network, the government extensively used its power of censorship on the press. In the national army, a conscript's training stressed loyalty towards the man who was both ruler and commander-in-chief. It was the educational system, however, that basically molded the individual. A compulsory course in "ethics" was introduced in the 1880s, emphasizing the Confucian obligation of filial piety and the national obligation of loyalty. This, along with compulsory military drill, shaped what the Meiji leaders considered to be the proper civic attitude.

In the Constitution of February 1889, the subject's relationship to his monarch was defined. The Imperial

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Brown, Nationalism in Japan, p. 93.

Rescript on Education in October 1890 subordinated education to the service of the State; patriotism became inseparable from education.³² In the Tokugawa period, bushido was the code of ethics for the samurai class; but in the post-Restoration, the government made bushido (contempt for death, exaltation of victory, and blind obedience) into, not only a cohesive force within the army, but a code of ethics for loyal citizens of the Japanese state, where loyalties³³ were directed to the emperor.

Patriotism was equated with loyalty to the emperor. Shinto faith, where the emperor's authority was divinely ordained, was established as a State religion by the new Meiji leaders in order to give the symbolism of Restoration--restoring the emperor to his rightful position of power--more than just ceremonial recognition. Instituting State Shinto gave the "Imperial Restoration" real substance because it raised Shintoism (of which the emperor was the hereditary head priest) to the level of a state religion. The government proceeded to insist on greater respect for Shinto deities and adoption of "high moral principles" in order to serve the emperor with deeper feelings of loyalty.³⁴

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Kenneth B. Pyle, The New Generation in Meiji Japan, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969), p. 157.

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Snyder, The New Nationalism, p. 173.

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Brown, Nationalism in Japan, p. 102.

After 1887, a rejection of Western manners began to develop, with a renewed interest in traditional standards and expansionism in order to strengthen the Japanese state. In 1888, the Seikyosha (Society for Political Education) was founded to preserve Japan's cultural autonomy--the birth of the "Japanese National Essence" Movement. Its philosophy was that only by maintaining a distinct cultural identity could Japan be an equal to the West. It was concerned with national pride, seeking to define Japan's uniqueness and place in international society.

With a new awareness of traditional values and a reawakening of interest in "things Japanese" combined with the development of a popular press, a national army, a universal education system, and a strong central government, sufficient social cohesion had been created to permit a popular response to national danger. The reform program of the government had created a modern army that gave the Japanese a new sense of confidence and urge to see their country in a more prominent position among nations.

Confucianism once more became a dominant force in the intellectual life of the Japanese. The government realized a widespread acceptance of Confucian principles of loyalty would create the desired ideological unity and weaken the

liberal Western principles. This new emphasis could be seen in the Imperial Rescript on Education, issued on October 30, 1890, and probably the most important document in modern Japanese history. Every Japanese knew its contents, and it was often read in the schools:

Know Ye, Our Subjects:

Our Imperial Ancestors have founded Our Empire on a basis broad and everlasting, and have deeply and firmly implanted virtue; Our subjects ever united in loyalty and filial piety have from generation to generation illustrated the beauty thereof. This is the glory of the fundamental character of Our Empire, and herein also lies the source of Our education. Ye, Our subjects be filial to your parents, affectionate to your brothers and sisters; as husbands and wives be harmonious, as friends, true; bear yourselves in modesty and moderation; extend your benevolence to all; pursue learning and cultivate arts, and thereby develop intellectual faculties and perfect moral interest; always respect the Constitution and observe the laws; should emergency arise, offer yourselves courageously to the State; and thus guard and maintain the prosperity of Our Imperial Throne coeval with heaven and earth. So shall ye be not only Our good and faithful subjects but render illustrious the best traditions of your forefathers.³⁶

In Japan, the atmosphere in the early 1890s was one of anxiety created by the Triple Intervention (Russia, France, and Germany) concerning China and then by Russia's activities in East Asia. However, Japanese society was more closely tied together by economic growth, a higher literacy rate and greater political centralization than ever before. The philosophy of Nihonshugi or "Japanism," almost identical

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Claude A. Buss, Asia in the Modern World, (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1964), p. 166.

with the official ideology, expressed the emerging nationalism of this time. Japanism stressed national solidarity, harmony between ruler and people, loyalty, filial piety, and colonial expansion as inherent in the national character. Christianity and Western liberalism were alien to the national character. By 1895, these ideas were being expressed with terms such as Japanism, national polity and preservation of national character and were helping to create a sense of national unity. The Meiji leadership was trying to propagate a national ideology that would justify its monopoly of power--the government was reasserting the old values of loyalty and obligation, solidarity and duty to superiors, and the imperial myths of state. However, the binding force behind acceptance of the nationalistic view came from within Japanese society; peer pressure from colleagues, neighbors, publicists and relatives.

The growing anti-Russian sentiment became the most prominent characteristic of nationalism at the turn of the century. The Black Dragon Society (also translated from Chinese as the Amur River Society) was organized at this time with the express purpose of driving Russia from East Asia and then welding Manchuria, Mongolia, and Siberia solidly under Japanese control. As the name indicated, its aim was to the extend Japan's sphere of influence as far

north in Manchuria as the Amur River. However, the platform of the Black Dragon Society was much broader:

We shall renovate the present system, foster a foreign policy aiming at expansion overseas, revolutionize domestic politics to increase the happiness of the people, and establish a social policy that will settle problems between labor and capital thus strengthening the foundation of the empire. We shall uphold the spirit of the Imperial Rescript to soldiers, promote a military spirit, and realize the fruits of the universal conscription system--thus perfecting the organs for national defense. We shall bring about a fundamental change in present-day education, which is copied after European and American system, and build the foundation for a national education based on kokutai--thus fostering the virtue and wisdom of the Yamato race.³⁷

After 1895, military victories, territorial acquisition, and wartime unity helped reinforce cultural identity. The exercise of national power through imperialism helped sustain the newly reacquired self-esteem and identity. On two occasions using military force, Japan had secured revision of the unequal treaties, establishment of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, colonies in Formosa and southern Sakhalin, recognition by the West of Korea as a Japanese protectorate, the Treaty of Portsmouth and important rights in south Manchuria.³⁸

The rise of modern nationalism in Japan could be seen in two phases during Meiji. The first, from 1887 to 1895, was associated with a victorious war against China, an Asian neighbor. By 1887, for the first time, social cohesion was

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Ibid., p. 139.

³⁸

Pyle, The New Generation in Meiji Japan, p. 175.

sufficient enough to permit a truly popular mass response to national danger. The press, army, universal education system and strong government combined to create a deep sense of national unity, even though the actual danger was relatively small. The second phase, from 1895 to 1905, was demonstrated by the confidence created by the victory over a western power, Russia. Growing anti-Russian sentiments had become the most prominent characteristic of nationalism at the turn of the century. The victory against Russia was the point at which nationalism took on confidence rather than fear. The tenseness from having to prove equality on the international scene was gone; a sense of national pride over the victory and over Japan's new place as a world power prevailed.

After the Russo-Japanese War, kokutai again emerged, not from a fear of national danger, but as a desire to rationalize the new status that Japan had achieved. It was a less aggressive type of nationalist thought than had been seen before. As a result of this line of thought, a conservative movement developed--Kukumin Dotoku Undo or the National Morals Movement.³⁹ Participants were stimulated by feelings of anxiety about the spread of naturalism, individualism, socialism, and other ideologies foreign to Japan.

The Black Dragon Society continued to be prominent after the war. From 1905 to 1918 the society was concerned with extending Japanese influence and with developing Japanese commercial and industrial enterprises on the continent of Asia. The Society was instrumental initially in its attempts to integrate Korea into the Japanese empire--economically, politically, and socially. Looking beyond Korea, it envisioned the industrial and commercial development of Manchuria. By 1906, the government was wholeheartedly pursuing the development of Manchuria. As Japanese expansion gained momentum, Black Dragon Society members began to focus their interests on new frontiers in China.

C. THE GENERATIONS OF TAISHO AND SHOWA

The Meiji period ended in 1912 with the death of the emperor, who was succeeded by a son who took the reign name of Taisho. The effect of the death of Emperor Meiji and the suicide of General Maretsuke Nogi and his wife on Meiji Japan was best dramatized in Natsume Soseki's novel Kokoro. The main character took his own life upon hearing the news of the deaths, which represented an end of an era--the "Spirit of Meiji" was gone.

In actuality, few could have surpassed the dynamism and personal strength of Emperor Meiji; but his successor could not have been more different and was even said to be

mentally incompetent. Shortly after Taisho began, voices which called for a liberation from the recent past and establishment of a new political consciousness were being heard. The youth of Taisho had lost the idealism that was seen in Meiji. In fact, Japanese society was undergoing structural changes before the Taisho period even began. In response to the loss of "state ideals," the Meiji government had issued the Boshin imperial rescript in 1908, which acknowledged the crisis in national ideology and the growing sense of confusion. The rescript called for unification by working hard and giving up all pleasures and entertainment. The word "Boshin" invoked the very essence of the Meiji period since it was the "Boshin War of 1868" that started the Restoration.⁴¹

While Meiji Japan was associated with "bummei kaika" (civilized and enlightened); the Taisho period became associated with bunka or culture.⁴² The Meiji civilization became synonymous with self-sacrifice and nationalism; the Taisho culture with consumer life, individualism, culturalism and cosmopolitanism. The Taisho period saw

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Harry D. Harootunian, "Introduction: A Sense of an Ending and the Problem of Taisho," in Japan in Crisis, eds. Bernard S. Silberman and H. D. Harootunian (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), pp. 3-28.

41

Ibid.

42

Ibid.

personal self-cultivation and refinement, with private considerations beginning to become more important than public considerations.

The popularization of individualism could be seen in the linkage of success to self. Originally, risshin shusse (success and careerism) was the term used for success in one's career and simply signified the name of the family or one's native place, because to succeed was to honor one's family. In Taisho, success came to express the pursuit of the self alone in the private interest, no longer connected with the concept of honoring the family name. This individualism and emphasis on self could be seen as a reaction against the governmental demands of "self-sacrifice, perseverance and determination" in the realization of national goals. The Russo-Japanese War symbolized for many an end to the years of self-sacrifice. Public interest became private interest.⁴³ A transformation from the distinctively political to the emergence of the concept of society as an autonomous structure distinct from politics took place. Expansionism still was reenforcing national confidence.

During World War I, Japan experienced remarkable wartime prosperity as a result of supplying markets and providing war goods for the Allies; this was a vital factor in the

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Snyder, The New Nationalism, p. 169.

rise of even more confident national attitudes. However, by the end of the war, the decline in the demand for military goods and the disappearance of Japan's wartime favorable trade balance caused economic problems and social unrest. During this time, Japan had her first political party cabinet headed by the first commoner, Prime Minister Kei Hara. This was the result of not only the social unrest but the rising interest in democracy. By 1918, the demand for universal manhood suffrage had become a dynamic political issue.

Nationalism in the years following the Russo-Japanese War was not grounded in feelings of inferiority; this period was one of the most secure and prosperous in recent history.⁴⁴ Indeed, pride in national accomplishments and confidence in Japan's ability grew. There was a rise of new interest in the study of kokutai. It was believed that by understanding kokutai, one could better understand Japan's progress and help to assure future progress.

The period between 1919 and 1936 is a distinct stage in the development of nationalism. Nationalist energy was diverted from primarily one of taking advantage of foreign opportunities to one of strengthening the nation from within. It began, once more, to take on a "fearful"

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Shuichi Kato, "Taisho Democracy as the Pre-Stage for Japanese Militarism," in Japan in Crisis, eds. Silberman and Harootunian, pp. 217-236.

character. The emphasis during this period was upon internal reform; before 1931, it was directed mostly by
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civilians, and after 1931 by militarists.

Nationalism before 1931 was chiefly concerned with formulating and supporting various programs to save the nation from poverty and social strife. As early as 1919, leaders of the Black Dragon Society were redirecting their attention from abroad to Japan. They felt Japan was being weakened by internal economic, social, and political problems. Commercial expansion abroad was soon overshadowed by a new program of opposing radicalism within Japan. There were two streams of thought: one was opposed to all expressions of discontent and all programs that favored any revision of Japan's traditional social and political order, and the other was more moderate, it supported a program of "reconstruction" where discontent was quieted and the basic elements of Japanese tradition were preserved.

Ikki Kita, a Black Dragon Society member, formulated a plan for the reform of the Japanese state in his book, An
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Outline Plan for the Reconstruction of the Japanese State.

In this plan, the subversive forces were to be destroyed by a reconstruction that would alleviate the discontent on which foreign ideologies were feeding and which would also

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Brown, Nationalism in Japan, p. 180.

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Snyder, The New Nationalism, p. 174.

preserve the essential elements of the Japanese social order. A coup d'etat would be followed by the Emperor being handed all power and implementing the reconstruction program. The military would play a prominent role in every phase because they logically would have a greater sense of loyalty to the nation.

The National Reconstruction Movement flowered after 1931. With the collapse of Japan's silk trade and the decline in the price of rice, economic conditions were at their worst ever. Most blamed these problems upon incompetent politicians and were looking for a credible alternative.

Young military officers in emerging "national reconstruction" societies began to propagate the principles of the "reconstruction program." These young officers were mostly from rural families and were very aware of the economic distress of agricultural communities and were also disenchanted with the cutbacks on military expenditures by selfish and unpatriotic politicians. As relations with the West worsened as a result of the military moves in Manchuria, nationalism became more intense and began to assume a "fearful" character once more. A strong nationalist wave swept over the country as the West was viewed as being unreasonable and unjust in judging Japan's actions.

In 1936, with the young officer movement suppressed, the

conservative element in the Army assumed direct control over the course of nationalist thought. A government-supported educational program was formed to strengthen the emperor's position. With the upsurge of interest in democracy at the beginning of the Taisho period, greater attention was given to universal suffrage and political-party government than was given to kokutai and the Imperial institution. Emperor Taisho's psychological state weakened the prestige of the family as well. The lowest point was probably in 1923 when an attempt was made on the Regent's life. However, this changed after the conservatives came to power. As part of the new educational program, the Department of Education published a book, Principles of Kokutai.⁴⁷ As guidance for teachers, 300,000 copies were distributed with instructions that every effort should be made to make these principles the basis of Japanese education. The book emphasized that the mission of the Japanese people was to create a new culture by "sublimating and assimilating foreign culture" and by eliminating individualism--the basic doctrine of ultranationalism thus became a guide for public education.

The nation, as a whole, was subjected continuously to the influence of nationalist propaganda through the use of public information and entertainment media. The state shrines, schools, and police were highly centralized and

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Brown, Nationalism in Japan, p. 209.

became instruments of ideological control and stimulation. By 1936, the government was using the fields of communication and entertainment as revolutionary weapons.⁴⁸ Nationalism in the post-1936 period stressed the value and divine qualities of traditional institutions, principles, and standards--specifically, kokutai and the emperor institution. This ultranationalism was a government propelled movement. A keen awareness of Japan's foreign danger was fostered by the government to create more national unity. The government stirred up a greater sense of loyalty through a movement for the "spiritual mobilization of the nation." All political, social, cultural, religious, labor, youth, and business organizations were encouraged to unite into a single body. Great attention was given to the Japanese mission of establishing a new order in East Asia, known as the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, which became for Japanese citizens, a holy war, aimed at creating a new world order in which peace would prevail and the Asiatics would be liberated. By 1940, nationalist thought was directed more against Western exploitation than toward strengthening Japanese spirit.

The alignment with Germany after 1937 was associated with the adoption of political, economic, and educational

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Ibid., p. 215.

policies which pushed nationalism to an even more fanatical level. The New National Structure Movement was established in 1940, which called for replacing the old political parties structure with an all-encompassing single party. In October 1940, the new national structure did emerge and was called the Imperial Rule Assistance Association.⁴⁹ It was designed to be an organ in which all cultural, labor, youth, business and political activities were centered; but, in reality, it was nothing more than a propaganda agency under totalitarian control by the army.

In 1941, as part of the New National Structure Movement, the educational system was reorganized with the sole purpose of glorifying the principles of the Imperial Way. The Department of Education issued the book, The Way of the Subject, calling for destruction of self-centered and utilitarian ideas that had come from the West and implementation of the Way of the Subject, which made one clearly conscious of the responsibilities in serving the state.⁵⁰

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Ibid., p. 220.

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Ibid., p. 222.

III. ECONOMIC, POLITICAL AND SOCIAL TRENDS

In the early postwar period, the character of nationalism differed drastically from the ultranationalism of the prewar and World War II years. It was so different, as a matter of fact, that even its existence was questionable to some observers. To draw that conclusion was to misunderstand the basic nature of nationalism and to overlook its possible resurgence in a form that could strengthen or alternatively threaten the peace and security of the world. In Japan, the loyalty to nation was not changed, only its direction. In addition, in the immediate postwar years, the Japanese embraced the universalist ideas brought by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) and the Occupation. The immediate postwar nationalism was remarkably free of anti-foreign feelings--there was even an upsurge in internationalism with the Japanese proclaiming themselves "citizens" of the world.

The purpose of this section is to look at contemporary Japanese nationalism; first in how it has already manifested itself in economics and then in how it is surfacing in politics and social movements. One objective will be to examine in detail the changes and developments in Japan since World War II. Each area examined will include the

postwar policies put into effect by the Occupation and newly established democratic government, even though in many cases the changes were basically superficial, being thrust upon a nation just defeated in war.

A. ECONOMIC TRENDS

Following World War II, SCAP initiated the enactment of legislation that furthered the rights of workers and encouraged the formation of labor unions. For the first time in history, political power was being consciously used to bring about social justice in the interest of the working class and not the ruling class. The Trade Union Law, enacted in 1945, guaranteed the rights to organize, to bargain collectively, and to strike, and provided corrections for anti-union discrimination. The 1947 Labor Standards Law, established minimum working conditions for all workers.

By June 1948, union membership had reached 6,500,000 members. Two major federations emerged: The General Federation of Labor (Sodomei) representing the right-wing, and the Congress of Industrial Unions (Sanbetsu) representing the left-wing. Sanbetsu became increasingly Communist dominated and, in 1950, a large part of Sodomei's membership combined with some elements of the disintegrating Sanbetsu to form the General Council of Japanese Trade Unions (Sohyo). Sohyo remains the largest labor union in Japan and is the major supporter of the Social Democratic

Party of Japan. Right-wing socialist elements left Sohyo in 1954 and, in 1964, joined the remaining Sodomei to form the General Confederation of Japanese Labor Organizations (Domei). This move reflected the right-wing criticism of Sohyo's ultra-left orientation and emphasis on politics rather than economics. Domei is the major supporter of the Democratic Socialist Party. The other major labor organization is the Federation of Independent Unions (Churitsuroren).

Today, unions generally are formed on an enterprise-by-enterprise basis, their decisions are influenced by the conditions of the enterprise's management. Employers are very interested in the unions and the livelihood and welfare of their employees. The stability of Japan's labor-management relations is largely due to the comprehensive, harmonious functioning at three levels--workshops, plants, and enterprises. Labor-management councils have been created at each of these three levels.⁵¹ Areas of discussion include improvement of work processes and working conditions at the workshop level; productivity enhancement and working conditions at the plant level; and working conditions and matters of business management at the enterprise level.

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Hirohide Tanaka, "Low Growth and Aging Labor Force," Far East Economic Review, vol XXVII, 1 (January-March 1980): 41.

Japanese labor and management have viewed themselves as a "community bound together by a common faith."⁵² This mutual commitment by the corporation and the employee is the basis of Japanese employment and basically it is as follows. The corporation will retain in employment each person it hires, regardless of later temptation to terminate employment. Likewise, the employee will remain with that corporation once he has made his choice, regardless of more attractive alternatives later on. This exchange of commitments forms the core of the employment pattern. This pattern establishes an unusual identity between the employee, no matter what his rank, and the corporation. The individual will do as well or as badly as the corporation does. His security in life depends on the success of the corporation. In his employment, he is defending his own self-interest.

Although this lifetime employment system has been a major characteristic of Japan's labor-management relations, actual employment practices did undergo some realistic revisions. The lifetime employment system of hiring new school graduates regularly, training them, and employing them until a certain age was basically adhered to by the mainstay work force; however, a certain degree of

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Margaret Shapiro, "Entering Business, Japan-Style," The Washington Post, 10 April 1989, p. A1.

flexibility is evident. During the decade from 1955-65, during the period of "high economic growth," the proportion of new school graduates who left the companies who first hired them rose to as much as fifty percent.⁵³ As the "high growth" of the economy continued, the labor supply-demand situation was tight and it was difficult to hire new school graduates regularly. This resulted in the more frequent use of chuto-saiyo or midway hiring (hiring workers as needed between regular recruitments of new school graduates). Between 1959 and 1961, the proportion of chuto-saiyo in total annual employment rose to 65-70 percent among big businesses.⁵⁴

The seniority order wage system is based on the premise of "pay commensurate with skill accumulated through experience." Right after World War II, a delegation of the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) studied the Japanese wage system and recommended that pay be determined according to the content of work rather than personal elements such as age. It was never adopted. In the 1970s, businesses which adopted a pay scale linked with the content of work began to increase.⁵⁵ However, it was not a wholesale shift, but a

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Ken'ichi Furuya, "Labor-Management Relations in Postwar Japan: Their Reality and Change," Japan Quarterly, vol XXVII, 1 (January-March 1980): 30.

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Ibid.

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Ibid., p. 32.

compromise between the two systems with no clear-cut distinctions. Japan's wages linked to work content were not so strict as to require a change of pay in the case of a change in posts (such as in a western company). If the job-performing ability was the same, the pay did not change. Most Japanese favor good treatment for long-serving employees; the seniority based wages are not an issue between generations.

It is these three characteristics, labor unions organized on an enterprise-by-enterprise basis, a lifetime employment system, and a seniority order wage system, which have contributed to the effectiveness of labor and management. This is what foreigners refer to as "Japan, Inc." It is an all-encompassing term which includes the nationalistic drive of the state-oriented worker, that is the Japanese willingness to go to great lengths and devote considerable personal energy, at the expense of personal freedoms and family life, to achieve commercial success. On the management side, Japanese corporations have been ruthless in their willingness to lower prices rather than
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lose market share abroad.

In fact, it has been said that the Japanese zealous devotion to the emperor and country was not suppressed at the

end of the war but transferred to building an advanced industrial society. According to Edward Seidensticker in the Far East Economic Review, "War was for von Clausewitz an extension of politics. Business seems to be for the Japanese an extension of war. Profits are less important than dominance -- not of course that the two are not closely related."⁵⁷ As previously illustrated in the example of Japan and the League of Nations and now again in the attitude toward economics, power continues to be an important aspect of Japanese nationalism.

In analyzing nationalism in economics, the Japanese believe that their unique and superior economy is the result of distinctive cultural patterns inherent in Japanese society. An economic study appointed by Prime Minister Ohira in 1980, in its report, contributed the success of Japan's economy to traditional cultural values:

Unlike Western societies [which are based] on the "individual" or "self," the basic characteristic of Japanese culture is that, as shown in the Japanese word ningen, it values the "relationship between persons." In examining Japanese culture closely, we discover that this basic characteristic permeates throughout, and acts as a living foundation of, the workings and the system of the Japanese economy. Rather than encouraging intense competition among individuals, with each being wholly responsible for his actions, the Japanese economy relies on "collegial groups" that are based on various relationships created within and between companies. This tends to give rise to a phenomenon of dependence

(amae) that is induced by mutual reliance (motareai) among persons. In some instances, such a relationship can be detrimental to "freedom" and "competition" and contains many undesirable aspects. However, the Japanese economy, which [as exemplified in the word] ningen, is the very model which Western societies are now beginning to emulate⁵⁸

Japan is proud of its economic strength. In 1986, Prime Minister Nakasone said that he was proud that he could meet other world leaders as an equal. Also in 1986, the Nomura Institute issued a report in which was stated, "Pax Americana is on the wane . . . the future belongs to Japan."⁵⁹ Japan is the world's greatest creditor nation. It exports loans and investment. It is a major importer of raw and semi-finished materials and component parts. Japan has become a banker to the world. The Tokyo stockmarket's capitalization is equal to that of Wall Street; the yen has become one of the major trading currencies. The 1986 Nomura Institute report said, "On the currency front, Japan must speed up the internationalisation of the Yen. It is imperative that the Yen relieve the Dollar of some of the burdens it has been carrying as the basic transaction currency of the world."⁶⁰

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Charles Smith, "A Question of Course," Far Eastern Economic Review, (June 11, 1987): 56-92.

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Ibid., p. 4.

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Ibid., p. 7.

It is from this point, with Japan having become a major economic power, now the wealthiest nation in the world on a per capita basis, that Japanese politicians now dream of Japan becoming a major world political power.

B. POLITICAL TRENDS

In the immediate postwar years, Japan avoided controversy in international politics. A reaction to war and defeat, the political scene in Japan was shaped by a popular anti-war sentiment in society. It also was the product of the Yoshida Doctrine, a deliberate policy shaped by Shigeru Yoshida, a prime minister in the initial postwar period. The Yoshida Doctrine stressed that Japan should remain lightly armed and avoid international political involvement, freeing Japan for economic development. The succeeding prime ministers built upon the foundation laid by Yoshida. Hayato Ikeda, prime minister between 1960-64, built a national consensus for economic growth. Eisaku Sato, who followed Ikeda, established the principles of neither producing nor having nuclear weapons in Japan and of limited arms exports in noncontroversial cases. In 1976, the ban on weapons exports was extended to all countries, and the practice of limiting defense costs to one percent of gross national product was made a formal policy.

Political nationalism during these years focused on the belief it was Japan's mission to show the world that a

modern industrial state could exist without arms, possibly without national sovereignty.

Today, there are four major approaches or schools of thought within Japan concerning the future role of Japan in the world. According to Kenneth B. Pyle in his paper, "The Future of Japanese Nationality,"⁶¹ these categories are the progressive, the liberal-realist, the mercantilist, and the new nationalist. These categories are not all inclusive; not every individual fits neatly into one of these categories.

The progressives⁶² emerged in the postwar reform era. Their beliefs were shaped within the sphere of wartime disillusion, revulsion from Japanese nationalism, and distrust of traditional state power. They were advocates of the new postwar democratic order and were avid supporters of the role the Constitution envisioned for Japan in the world. Progressives saw Japan's postwar mission as that of being a modern industrial nation without arms--progenitor of a new peaceful international order. As victims of the atomic weapons, the Japanese saw themselves as "citizens of the world." It provided a justification for rejecting world politics and concentrating on rebuilding national

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Kenneth B. Pyle, "The Future of Japanese Nationality, An Essay in Contemporary History," Paper.

62

Ibid., pp. 26-32.

livelihood. Of course, this new world order never came to pass.

The values and institutions that the progressives fostered were eventually criticized for the rejection of Japan's own history and traditions. In recent years, their position has been less appealing and they have tried to relate progressive thinking to the past. For example, various progressive advocates have delved into Japanese history to find roots for pacifism and disarmament in Japanese tradition.

The progressives can be labeled as "utopian pacifists." Their vision of the future is that national greatness will not be determined by military power but will be based on a country's humanitarian ideals. In an international symposium on "Japan's Role in the World" held in 1979 to commemorate the centenary celebration of the Asahi Shinbun, Yoshikazu Sakamoto, professor of international politics at the University of Tokyo, said, "There exist in Japan the distinctive elements of a national identity which could become the core of a new and universal model of society. The role of the Japanese people in the community of mankind should be to build on this foundation a nuclear-free, pollution-free, resource-saving and open society."⁶³

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"Ureubeki Migi Senkai," Gendai Keizai (Spring, 1979). Quoted in Kenneth B. Pyle, "The Future of Japanese Nationality," p. 31.

Progressives dismiss the charge of utopianism by stating that there would be no reason for an armed country to invade a defenseless nation.

The progressives' popularity of the early postwar period began to fade with rapid economic growth and the people's reemerging belief in the uniqueness of their culture. Until the 1960s, 80 percent of the opinion leaders leaned to the progressive side, but today 80 percent are now of center or conservative thinking.

The liberal-realist school⁶⁴ of thought emerged in part by opposing the progressive vision of an unarmed and neutral Japan. They believed that the institution of the nation-state would not disappear, that nationalist feelings were still alive, and that national interests must be protected within the arena of international politics. The liberal-realists seek a democratic order; they see Japan's national interest in a cooperative defense relationship with the liberal democracies in general. The roots of this school of thinking can be traced to the prewar pro-Anglo-American groups whose moderate views of foreign policy and domestic reform existed before 1931. Massive rearmament is opposed to; however, a steady increase in defense expenditure is advocated in cooperation with the West. The report issued by the Comprehensive National Security Study Group in July

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Pyle, "The Future of Japanese Nationality," pp. 32-35.

1980 provides a clear picture of the position of the realists. The report stressed that Japan must replace the role of "economic giant and political dwarf" with an activist foreign policy and a substantial defense establishment. The liberal-realist view sharply criticizes the belief that Japan is "a special country" due to its exceptional historical experiences and constitutional restraints which prohibits its participation in international politics. The more vocal realists believe that to have a policy of reliance on the American nuclear umbrella and, at the same time, to refuse to allow nuclear weapons into Japan is a direct violation of international common sense.

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The third school of thought is the mercantilist. This line of thinking is concerned with the role Japan has been playing since the 1960s in the international system. This school advocates that Japan's national interest is properly seen as a great trading nation. In November 1975, Masataka Kosaka, one of Japan's influential political scientists, defined the national purpose in line with this thinking. He stated, "A trading nation does not go to war, neither does it make supreme efforts to bring peace. It simply takes

advantage of international relations created by stronger nations."⁶⁶

Advocates of this school have likened Japan in the international system to the class distinctions of Tokugawa Japan. The United States and the Soviet Union are the samurai, Japan, the merchant, and the third world, the peasant. The merchants of the sixteenth century learned to maneuver in the midst of a samurai-dominated society and became the true holders of power in the country. Soko Yamaga (1922-1985) wrote, "Samurai live by honor, while farmers, artisans, and merchants live by interest."⁶⁷ This quote could aptly apply to the role of the United States and Japan in the international system.

The new nationalism is the fourth school of thought⁶⁸ and the one most identified with the leaders of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party. Like the liberal-realists, they recognize the continuing role of power in the world and criticize the stance of the progressives. Further, the new nationalists reject important aspects of the postwar order, because they do not hold the belief of a shared community of

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"Tsusho Kokka Nihon no Unmei," Journal of Social and Political Ideas in Japan, III. Quoted in Pyle, "The Future of Japanese Nationality," p. 35.

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Pyle, "The Future of Japanese Nationality," p. 12.

⁶⁸

Ibid., pp. 43-47.

interest and values with the West that would lead to cooperation in an alliance.

The most well-known new nationalist, Ikutaro Shimizu, wrote, "On the one hand, Japan must encourage friendly relations with America, the Soviet Union and all other countries, but at the same time we must not forget for an instant that Japan is alone. In the end we can only rely on Japan and the Japanese."⁶⁹ The new nationalists believe in the necessity of more than a modest buildup of arms. Economic superiority combined with military might would make Japan a political superpower. Because of Japan's socio-economic and technological achievements, the new nationalists are confident that Japan is capable of an independent role in world politics.

The feeling of new nationalism is no longer restricted to certain circles in the LDP. The political leaders are making a concerted effort to foster the resurgence of nationalism and are focusing on such traditional issues as the emperor, Shintoism and the Yasukuni Shrine. They realize that a foundation is needed to once again harness nationalist sentiment in society. Former Prime Minister Nakasone led this effort by defining "national identity." He repeatedly used the phrase "identity of Japan" in public,

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Nippon Yo, Kokka Tare, p. 97. Quoted in Pyle, "The Future of Japanese Nationality," p. 44.

emphasizing Japan should seek to establish its own identity, taking into account its long history and culture. In 1985, the government appropriated US \$140,000 to establish a Japanology Institute in Kyoto. In establishing the Kyoto school, Prime Minister Nakasone said, "Now is the time to establish Japan's identity once again."⁷⁰

This new nationalism was manifested in many of Nakasone's speeches and included the speech in September 1986 when he suggested that the presence of racial minorities in the US drags education standards down. Around the same time was the dismissal of Education Minister Masayuki Fujio who emphatically criticized Japanese textbooks for not being sufficiently patriotic. He stated that Japan had done "nothing to be ashamed of" during the war and that "the core of our education should be to make our children Japanese again."⁷¹

Beginning with the Nakasone ministry, Japan's national soul--how it must be nurtured, defended, even held up as a model to the outside world--is being debated by politicians, scholars and journalists. Defining Japaneseness has grown into a huge intellectual industry, responsible for a multitude of books, articles, television programs, and radio shows. Radio Nippon does little more than discuss the

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Ian Buruma, "A New Japanese Nationalism," p. 38.

⁷¹

Ibid., p. 23.

issues of the Japanese soul. A recent best selling book in Japan, written by a neurologist, was about the uniqueness of the Japanese brain.⁷²

The search to regain Japan's identity has also come to be called Yamatoism or the cult of national soul. The name comes from the ancient clan that unified Japan in the 5th century and has strong nationalist connotations (the Black Dragon Society referred to the Yamato race in its platform). Nakasone, himself, had a strong following of Yamatoist intellectuals. In the writings of these Yamatoists, the loss of Japanese soul/ national identity/ Yamato spirit is blamed on foreigners, specifically Americans who occupied Japan after the war, imposing the "peace constitution" and a new educational system. Jun Eto, a professor of English literature, wrote that the American occupation destroyed the continuity of Japanese culture. Former Education Minister Fujio called the occupation period an act of "racial revenge." Takeshi Muramatsu wrote that "spiritually, the postwar identity crisis is much more serious . . . because the postwar identity was created by foreigners."⁷³

Society is becoming aware of this new movement and social trends suggest that these ideas will fall upon fertile ground. The next section will look at one of the

⁷²

Ibid., p. 26.

⁷³

Ibid., p. 38.

strongest transmitters of tradition and consequently nationalism in Japan today--the woman and her family. Although one would tend to believe that the role of women in society would have drastically changed with the postwar modernization, it has not. Even though there have been obvious evolutionary changes that have naturally evolved in an industrial society, the basic role of women remains unchanged.

C. WOMEN AND FAMILY

In the Meiji Civil Code of 1898, the family was given precedence over the individual through a series of laws intended to preserve the traditional samurai family, the ie. All effective power in family decisions was concentrated on the head of the house, which was usually determined by male succession. Upon marriage, the woman became a member of her husband's family and subject to his authority on all matters.

With the coming of the American Occupation, major changes began to occur in the area concerning women. Following the draft of the constitutional revisions, the general election was held on April 10, 1946; and, for the first time in history, Japanese women exercised the right to participate in politics, with 39 women elected as members of the Diet. Even with this right, it was recognized that the position of women would not be permanently affected unless changes were made in their private lives. All the

provisions concerning the ie were removed from the Civil Code. The postwar Civil Code limited the necessity for parental consent to marriage only to those cases involving people under legal age, it abolished the right of the husband to take charge of his wife's property, it stipulated fair and equal grounds for divorce for both spouses, and it allowed for no preferential treatment toward the man in cases of adultery. In addition, it set out new provisions for the apportionment of property, with the objective of establishing stronger guarantees of a stable livelihood for the wife after divorce. It also provided equal rights as parents for both father and mother; and, by abolishing the old law stipulating succession to the family estate by the oldest son, the revised law established the right of all children to receive equal proportions of an inheritance and the right of the spouse to receive an equitable share.⁷⁴

Successive revisions included giving women, in 1976, the right to retain their married name after a divorce if they wished and, in 1980, broadening the inheritance rights of the spouse.

In analyzing the role of the woman, the 1980s marked important "firsts" for the Japanese woman. Included among these firsts were the first woman ambassador, the first

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Kaji Chizuko, "The Postwar Wife--No Longer Incompetent," The Japan Quarterly, vol XXXI, 1 (January-March 1984): 311.

woman head of a research institute at Tokyo University, the first woman chairman of a political party, the first woman stationmaster for the Japan National Railway, the first woman member of the Science Council of Japan, and the first female Imperial guard.⁷⁵

Even with these steps forward, traditional undercurrents remain even today. The postwar changes were thrust upon a society that had not yet evolved to the point of having a foundation for such ideas. Major support for an equality movement is not evident. The Japanese woman's historical image is a difficult one to shed. It could be argued that the discrimination society attaches to women trying to redefine their role is a major restraining factor. However, it could be argued, as well, that the majority of women today may not want a new image. In an informal survey made by Meiji University in 1984 of more than 500 female students who were attending 27 universities in Tokyo, 70 percent of those students did not want entire mental and financial independence, 47 percent felt the present male-dominated Japanese society was good as it is, and nearly 80 percent said they were not interested in the women's liberation movement.⁷⁶

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Keiko Higuchi, "Women in Transition," The Japan Quarterly, vol XXIX, 3 (July-September 1982): 311.

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Atsuko Chiba, "Trappings of Success, But an Inner Emptiness," Far East Economic Review, vol 123, 1 (January 5, 1984): 30.

Three features of the traditional view still have particular impact on women, influencing their ideas. The first was the view that the difference in the status of men and women was natural and legitimate. The second one was the unquestioned authority of the husband over the wife. The third was the belief that husband and wife belong in separate spheres of activities with definite role divisions.

In the 1960s, in order to achieve rapid economic growth, Japan again reemphasized the traditional male-female division of labor. The human relations and social behavior derived from the dominance of the maternal principle have been major factors in producing a workforce that can function as a single, integrated force--the *ningen* referenced earlier in former Prime Minister Ohira's report. A society based on the maternal principle places priority on the maintenance of a condition of equilibrium with regard to space. The individual restrains personal self-assertiveness and everyone acts in concert. In this way, the condition of equilibrium, where everyone has his/her own "space," is not disturbed. The maternal principle has always been dominant in Japanese society; but, with the emphasis placed, for industrialization purposes, on the male/female role division, it has assumed a position of even greater proportion with strong nationalistic implications--her role in suppressing individualism in her children contributes to a society able to focus on national goals. Government

efforts at reenforcing female/male roles are still evident today. A government endorsed "Family-Oriented Policy" appeared as late as 1979 stressing the home arts in education for girls with emphasis on keeping house, rearing children, and caring for the elderly.⁷⁷ Conservative attitudes are reappearing in the form of such slogans as "Strengthen our family foundations." There have also been moves to institute an annual "Family Day."⁷⁸

In prewar and wartime Japan, women found their primary role and identity in the domestic sphere. Education was geared toward the accomplishment of wife and motherhood. Marriage was a necessary step toward fulfillment, and motherhood produced a mother-child identity. Female singlehood was and still is a stigma that Japanese women try to avoid. There are women who seek professional careers and those that combine motherhood and jobs, but the vast majority of women in Japan choose marriage and the profession of housewife and mother. In fact, marriage is often called a woman's eikyu shushoku, or lifetime employment.

Before World War II, girls received special training for marriage. These lessons, called okeiko, provided training

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Harue Fujii, "Education for Women," The Japan Quarterly, vol XXIX, 3 (July-September 1982): 302.

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Chizuko, "The Postwar Wife," p. 16.

in such arts as cooking, sewing, flower arranging, and tea ceremony and were more important than advanced schooling. Today, neither boys nor girls are expected to do much housework because of the value placed on studying and doing well in school. Since the war, girls have continued to study some okeiko but much more emphasis has been placed on academic education. Training in the feminine arts has been replaced by English, literature, art, and music.⁷⁹ A woman's general educational level is more important today than her training in feminine arts. For women, as well as men, the rank in society is determined by the college they attend. If one wants to marry a graduate of a good university, one must attend a good university. The marital relationship is one of interdependence. The specialized role belongs to the husband and is one in which he fulfills the requirements of his job and brings home the money. The wife's role is generalized; she works inside the home, fulfilling the needs of her family which include providing the nurturance for children, husband and parents. Marriage is still defined by roles than by relationships. Therefore, if the husband/wife relationship sours, it does not necessarily affect the performance of the roles. In

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Suzanne H. Vogel, "Professional Housewife: The Career of Urban Middle Class Japanese Women," The Japan Interpreter 1, vol XXXI, (Winter 1978): 3.

addition, much more emphasis is placed on the parent-child relationship than the husband/wife relationship.

The Japanese woman has a large degree of independence. Although the Japanese housewife is totally dependent upon her husband economically, she is completely in charge of her own house and children. Her husband is completely dependent on her in this respect. In fact, the government and community pay special attention to mothers as "molders of the coming generation" and offer help and guidance. This can be seen in a variety of government-sponsored classes on
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child-rearing.

The woman has progressed from the prewar subordination to the male--that is subordination to first her father, then her husband, and finally her son. Her relationship today might be described as separate and more equal than in the past. However, in public, a man is socially pressured to act superior to the woman. If a husband appears henpecked, he is likely to be ridiculed by female as well as male peers. In fact, in society today, the wife's place is central to the family and basic to society. As a mother, she is very aware of her role in nonacademic training, especially social and moral training.

In popular women's magazines, in the past, the ideal woman was portrayed as devoted to husband and family and a manager of household affairs. Now the theme of these magazines has been to portray the woman as a "professional housewife," even a working wife, who preserves her own identity and is in contact with society at large.⁸¹ More and more young women want independence or at least to read of independence in these magazines; but, at the same time, they rush out to buy Kenji Suzuki's top-selling books on how "to be Japanese"--correct bowing, proper speaking tones, correct way of opening and closing the door, etc.⁸²

The housewife of today does have more time. In 1940, the average woman would send her youngest child to elementary school when she was 42 years old and eight years later would probably die. In 1977, the average woman sent her youngest child to school at the age of 34 and could expect to live as long as 44 more years.⁸³

There has been a phenomenal growth of housewives' hobbies and culture centers. The number of female employees is steadily increasing, and there is an indication that

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Higuchi, "Women in Transition," p. 314.

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Ian Buruma, "Young Japanese Bow to an Old Tradition--and Keep Bowing," Far East Economic Review, vol 122, 49 (December 8, 1983): 53.

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Chiba, "Trappings of Success, But an Inner Emptiness," p. 30.

women are beginning to return to work after raising their children. There is a trend toward employment outside the household as modernization makes the everyday housework easier and easier. In fact, 39 percent of the total labor force are women, but their jobs are, for the most part, of a menial nature. The average wage is 53 percent that of the Japanese male counterpart.⁸⁴ A women's group cooperative called the "labor bank" has surfaced, where time and labor are pooled and exchanged according to individual schedules.

So, today's Japanese woman is a blend of a person more in touch with society and its thinking but one who still favors tradition and its importance. Within the family, she assumes an extremely important role in shaping the political attitudes and behavior of children, believed to be even more responsive to political cues than men.⁸⁵ She is the transmitter of political culture and beliefs in the socialization process, to include the outlook on nation. Being conservative and more likely to support the values and orientations of traditional, religious and social groupings, the traditional ideas being encouraged today by Japanese leaders will likely be well received by the woman and transmitted on to her children.

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Ibid., p. 31

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Susan J. Pharr, Political Women in Japan, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981), p. 78.

D. YOUTH AND EDUCATION

As for Japanese children, youth and education is of prime concern to today's new nationalists. The changes in the youth from the old generation to the new have caused great concern about the lack of moral education in the school system.

The older generation can recall a time when children used to play by stealing persimmons from other people's gardens. When caught doing this, they were reprimanded and sent home. Those who got away became heroes among their playmates. These children called gakidaisho or kid bosses and their friends were watched with concern by adults, but nobody called them "juvenile delinquents." This is the theory of "shoplifting--persimmon theft" where gakidaisho and his friends have lost the fruit trees that used to be their source of fun and have come to seek substitutes in stores.⁸⁶

Juvenile delinquency in Japan has peaked several times since the end of World War II,⁸⁷ once in 1950-1951 when the nation's postwar reconstruction got under way and also in the mid-1960s when the "high growth" period of the economy introduced marked changes in society. Presently, crimes

⁸⁶ "Japan 83," Far East Economic Review, vol 120, 24 (June 16, 1983): 80.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

committed by minors corresponds to approximately 50 percent of the country's crime rate. A large percentage of those taken into custody for penal code offenses committed larceny. In the area of larceny, burglary declined while instances of shoplifting and bicycle and motorcycle theft increased. An increase in light delinquency committed by low-age minors has shown a rise in what is called "fun-type" delinquency--associated with showing off and getting a thrill. This increase in "fun-type" delinquency is closely related to the generalization of delinquency where delinquency is spreading into the middle- and upper-class families.

This trend of rising "fun-type" delinquency is accompanied by recent sharp increases in violence within the family and at school. Various areas, mainly in the educational process, have been suggested as possible causes of the problem of delinquency.

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The first is in regard to school education. School education attaches too much importance to intellectual training and neglects moral training and cultivation of esthetic sentiments. It is with this argument that conservatives take the position that the Ministry of Education needs more control over the system of textbook

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Kazuhiko Tokoro, "Change in Traditional Society and 'Delinquencization,'" The Japan Quarterly, vol XXVIII, 3 (July-September 1981): 364.

authorization and teaching instructions to eradicate individualism tinges. Some have even demanded a revival of the prewar morals course. During his tenure in office, Prime Minister Nakasone called for "all-around education, particularly character training."⁸⁹ The liberals consider the problem to be rooted in the competition for entrance into advanced schools. Students are forced to undergo frequent achievement tests where the results are usually expressed in terms of statistical "deviation" to show a particular student's capability in respect to the group's. A sense of inferiority is common in those who receive low "deviation" values; these are the students called ochikobore (those that fall behind academically). Evidence indicates that ochikobore are main sources of delinquency and school violence.

The most widely discussed problem of violence in schools today is ijime or bullying.⁹⁰ In one year alone, 1,920 (one percent) of the 192,365 youths who were suspects in criminal cases were arrested in connection with 531 incidents of violence and delinquency related to bullying. Violence or extortion by children against other children accounted for 502 (95 percent) of the bullying incidents. The other five

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Murray Sayle, "Trouble East of Eton," Far East Economic Review, vol 121, 28 (July 14, 1983): 21.

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Susan J. Pharr, "Japan in 1985," Asian Survey, vol XXVI, 1 (January 1985): 64.

percent involved children seeking revenge against those who had bullied them, including one murder and three attempted murders. There were also seven suicides as a result of bullying. Educators and parents are concerned because these recorded cases constitute only a fraction of all bullying incidents.⁹¹

Violence in school is not necessarily restricted to just that between children but has also been directed toward teachers, traditionally revered in Japan. In a recent academic year, one in seven junior high schools and one in ten senior high schools experienced serious violence in the classroom.⁹²

The second area of concern is home education, and it is here that the maternal principle surfaces again.⁹³ The maternal principle aspect's chief function is to contain--it contains everything. The most important thing for the child is that he/she is included in this total containment. Within the mother's realm, everything the child does is permitted and forgiven. In other words, a mother might say, "my child is a good child."

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William Wetherall, "The Unfortunate Victims of Japan's Classroom Bullies," Far East Economic Review, vol 128, 20 (May 23, 1985): 65.

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Sayle, "Trouble East of Eton," p. 24.

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Kawai Hayao, "Violence in the Home," The Japan Quarterly, vol XXVIII, 3 (July-September 1981): 373.

In contrast to this is the father's words, "only the good child is my child," which form the basis of the paternal principle. The paternal principle is more adhered to in Europe and the United States. The chief function of this principle is to cut--it separates all things. It classifies everything into black and white, good and bad. The paternal aspect includes the strictness to discipline the child.

The maternal principle is dominant in Japanese society and produces "good children" that become totally divorced from any expression of "independence" or "individuality." As mentioned earlier, this insures the condition of equilibrium where every person has his/her given "space." In prewar Japan, the father was a frightening existence and a strongly felt presence. The prewar father was able to stress the paternal principle within the bounds set by the maternal principle. But with the economic growth and resultant pronounced role separation, that paternal influence is no longer a functioning control. In fact, in the 1970s, the media continually addressed the problems of chichi naki shakai (the fatherless society); a number of sociological studies showed that many Japanese fathers barely played any role at all in the home.

This subject of family disintegration was a major film topic in Japan in 1980s. The films were Tsumiki Kuzushi (Toy Blocks Tumbling Down) about teenage violence in the home and Kazoku Geimu (Family Games) about deep rifts created between parents and children by the intense school examination competition. These films blamed the parents, especially the father, urging him to reevaluate his parental role.⁹⁵

In home education, the overprotectiveness and over-involvement of the mother is interfering with the healthy growth of a child's self-consciousness. Traditionally, the parent-child relationship has been the most important; and, with the extra time of today's housewife, her energy is channeled toward her children. A category of mothers called kyoiku mama (education mama) has emerged and refers to the mother who becomes overly involved in the education of her children with the intention of getting them into the most prestigious a school of advanced level as possible.⁹⁶ It is because parents place so much emphasis on the evaluation of their children's performance in school that "juku"⁹⁷ preparatory schools flourish. These children usually have

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Ibid.

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Kazuhiko, "Change in Traditional Society and 'Delinquencization,'" p. 365.

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Nigel Holloway, "The Blackboard Bungle," Far East Economic Review, (6 April 1989): 65.

restricted playtimes and their social development in terms of independent action and cooperation with others is retarded. The children even end up being relieved of all work within the household so that they can devote all their time to studying. It is within these families of extremely "good children" that cases of violence have been known to occur.

The children who are left free without any parent-imposed schedules, the *ochikobore*, are just as tragically affected. These children tend to associate with children who also have free time and the play groups have shown a tendency to be undesirable.

The boso⁹⁸zoku phenomenon which began in the 1970s is a good example of this. It is a term used to describe the gangs of Japanese youth which have become notorious for their raucous and at times violent and destructive behavior throughout Japan. The word boso indicates wild and reckless motion at high speeds and can imply "going out of control" while the suffix zoku means tribe or kin group. These gangs represent the defiance of frustrated youth who have lost at the academic game. All of these youth share one quality, they are middle class children who are not on the "elite track" to a good university and white-collar job after

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Ronald P. Loftus, "The Idioms of Contemporary Japan XVII," The Japan Interpreter, vol XI, 3 (Winter 1977): 391-392.

graduation. Hosei University professor Chiba Yasunori has identified major characteristics of this group of youth. Besides having a relatively large amount of free time which would have been filled with attempting to qualify for university entrance examinations, they also possess an internalized low opinion of their own intellectual abilities, a searching for some kind of direction, little incentive to uphold the existing social framework, a strong antipathy toward the elite (academically successful) of society, and a low level of competitive energy for social achievement according to accepted norms. They are acutely aware that they constitute a minority.

In addition, the youth that fall into the category of the bosozoku phenomenon frequent the widely publicized entertainment areas and are one of the main targets of the flourishing sex industry. Lawmakers concerned about the "nation's morals" and alarmed by reports of sexual promiscuity and drug abuse among teenagers put several popular teenage magazines out of business. The magazines' sex content included articles on masturbation, petting, and intercourse.⁹⁹

One of Japan's all time best selling books in recent years, Totto-chan, is a fictional story that points out the

failings of modern-day Japanese education. Enmeshed in red-tape and bureaucratic procedures and swamped with massive curricula and overcrowded classrooms, school teachers are not able to provide individual instruction. The pace and rigid methodological framework produce masters of rote learning. There is no room for creative or innovative teaching or original student work. Good grades are of paramount importance in a society where status is largely determined by an individual's academic pedigree.

A controversial figure in Japanese education in the early 1980s was Hiroshi Totsuka, a sporting hero turned educator (with no prior education background). He had made the statement that education was simply a matter of "giving orders and getting them obeyed."¹⁰¹ He believed that once children's rights were recognized through Occupational reforms, everything went wrong. His school was run under pre-World War II militaristic doctrine in order to incorporate "old Japanese spirit into the molly coddled youth."¹⁰² However, he was arrested and prosecuted because some children perished before he reached his goals. The

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Akira Nakano, "What Ever Happened to Progressive Education?," The Japan Quarterly, vol XXX, 2 (April-June 1983): 149.

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Sayle, "Trouble East of Eton," p. 21.

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"Japan 84," Far East Economic Review, vol 124, 24 (June 14, 1984): 66.

mere fact that he found enthusiastic parental support is an indication of the despair with the education system.

With the growing concern over the problem of youths, the government has revived efforts to return to placing more emphasis on moral training. It is against this backdrop that the education controversy has once again become a major political issue.

The year of 1945 marked the end of governmental control of schools but the issue of education has continued to be a major source of political conflict. In 1946, the first Japanese history book to begin with a description of the Stone Age instead of mythology was published. The following year, the Fundamental Law of Education was enacted which set new guidelines for education and educational administration. In the preface was stated the resolve to realize through education the ideals of the constitution.¹⁰³ The School Education Law, passed in that same year, returned the publication of textbooks to the private sector. The responsibility of choosing textbooks rested at the school level. The teachers became organized into a powerful union dominated by radical left-wing leaders.

Immediately upon the end of the Occupation, a government committee submitted an education report entitled

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Masami Yamazumi, "Textbook Revisions: The Swing to the Right," The pan Quarterly, vol XXVIII, 4 (October-December 1981): 474.

"Recommendations Concerning Reforms in the Educational System." The basic premise of the report stated that by basing Japan's educational system on that of a foreign country with a differing culture, many undesirable elements were incorporated into the system. This was the beginning of a controversy over education which has continued to the late 1980s. According to a report submitted to Prime Minister Nakasone in March 1984 by the private Council on Culture and Education, education in any nation represents an effort to transmit that nation's culture to the present and coming generations.

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There has been a continual drive by conservative parties to "correct the excesses" of the Occupation reforms. There have been efforts to pass legislation to prevent teachers from joining political parties and to prohibit their union from disseminating political literature, to replace elected education committees by nominated ones, to restore central control over textbooks, and to institute a merit-rating system which would increase the teachers' liability to discipline on political grounds.

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In addition to resentment within the teachers' union over the efforts by the government to control textbooks, the

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"Japan 84," p. 58.

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Livingston, Moore, Oldfather, Postwar Japan, (New York: Random House, Inc., 1973), p. 530.

government has been further criticized on the issue of the
prewar national anthem.¹⁰⁶ According to prewar texts, Kimi
ga yo (the Imperial Reign) was a prayer that the emperor's
reign would be eternal and became the unofficial national
anthem. After the occupation, it surfaced again when the
minister of education in 1950 recommended that it be sung at
school gatherings on national holidays. In 1958, it was
included as one of the songs in the elementary school
curriculum for music class. Finally, in 1978, in the
revised edition of the Course of Studies for elementary
schools, it was officially designated as the national
anthem. In addition, in 1982, the Ministry of Education
directed the revision of history textbooks in order that the
invasion of China would be portrayed as an advance and the
rape of Nanking as an incident.¹⁰⁷

In the 1970s, there were attempts to revive the Imperial
Rescript on Education. In 1974, Prime Minister Tanaka
stated, "Education today overemphasizes intellectual
development at the expense of moral development. While we
fatten children's intellects their morals starve."¹⁰⁸ In
fact, the roots for this thinking can be traced back to the

¹⁰⁶ Yamazumi, "Textbook Revision: The Swing to the
Right," p. 477.

¹⁰⁷ "Japan 83," p. 80.

¹⁰⁸ Yamazumi, "Textbook Revision," p. 478.

Occupation when the Ministry of Education did not want to abolish the Imperial Rescript on Education because it contained "universal moral principles." Prime Minister Tanaka, in reference to the Imperial Rescript, has said, "Much of it expresses universal moral principles. It has qualities that transcend its form, that speak to us today as then."¹⁰⁹

In fact, the Japanese use the term "advanced-country disease" to refer to various social maladies such as alcoholism, nervous disorders, divorces, and a social phenomenon called johatsu (evaporation), where people just totally abscond from society. There is a growing conservative consensus of opinion that the loss of motivation and direction among people has been compounded by individual greed at the expense of dedicated self-sacrifice¹¹⁰ to a common cause.

During the Occupation, certification of textbooks was required in order to insure the elimination of nationalistic and militarist indoctrination. This certification has been continued by the Ministry of Education, but it is used now to control antimilitarist and antinationalist teachings. With the government conservatives on one side and the teachers' union on the other, each is sure the other is

¹⁰⁹

Ibid.

¹¹⁰

"Japan 83," p. 82.

determined to destroy its influence by alienating the minds
and affections of Japan's students.¹¹¹

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Livingston, Moore, Oldfather, Postwar Japan, p. 533.

IV. CONCLUSION

From the historical perspective, it becomes evident that the pervasive theme of nationalism was and remains kokutai. The essence of what it means to be Japanese was codified in the imperial rescript--the culmination of nationalist spirit. The important aspect of kokutai is the crucial absence of a separation of church and state. In western societies, the individual was able to determine right and wrong based on religious principles. This did not exist in Japan. There was no personal morality; what was moral was determined by the direction of the emperor and nation. The supremacy of state permeated every aspect of individual life to include personal morality, art, literature, justice, etc. Everything was determined in relation to the state. This concept of morality is best illustrated by Kiyoshi Inoue, a former history professor at Kyoto University, in a statement he made in reference to Emperor Hirohito's death, "When the new emperor ascends to the throne, every Japanese will be judged by whether he celebrates this or not. That is how people will be determined to be good Japanese or bad Japanese."¹¹²

¹¹²

Andrew Horvat, "Essence of an Era," Far East Economic Review, (6 October 1988): 35.

As seen in the social section, in postwar Japan the imposed occupational revisions did not erase this basic social order. It merely added the political machinery of democracy. Furthermore, over 40 years' experimentation with western democracy has yielded little more than an elaborate bureaucratic system. The democratization went no further than institutional and legal reforms. It did not reach the social structure or the people's way of life, much less their mental outlook. The emperor may have been removed as the symbol but the spiritual essence remained.

In society today, the definition of self is still inextricably tied to "we Japanese." In the economic arena, it is said that devotion to the emperor and country was not suppressed but simply transferred to what is now called the "Japanese work ethic" and the drive to be a major economic world power. However, this can be seen in even more subtle examples drawn from society.

For the good of society, the mother's most important contribution continues to be to reinforce the child's role in relation to society (individual versus group). The concept that marriage is defined by specialized roles and not necessarily by feelings is mirrored in the concept of state and self. An individual is not responsible for determining what is just or what is right, but for fulfilling his role in the nation's course.

As far as the youth of today are concerned, remnants of the "prewar" self exist. The first impression one gets on looking at the youth today, is that society is fundamentally changing, with specific negative implications for nationalism. Indeed, by Japanese definition, there is a major upheaval in the youth scene of today. However, we must keep in mind that in comparison to other societies, the Japanese problem affects a relatively small percentage of society. In fact, juvenile delinquency does have the historical precedence of the *gakidaisho* or kid bosses. The phenomenon of the "lost souls" again demonstrates that the concept of private self has yet to develop. The children who lost at the academic game also lost direction and purpose. Self-worth for youth still exists as defined by national polity. Today, businessmen, engineers and scientists still symbolize the forward movement of Japan.

Just as self still exists in society in relation to the concept "we Japanese," tradition, instead of conflicting with modernity, runs parallel with it. Japanese thinkers of the late 19th century coined the slogan Wakon Yosai or "Japanese spirit, Western techniques" to describe the state of being modern and still Japanese.¹¹³ This framework remains and is a crucial component of Japanese nationalism.

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Buruma, "A New Japanese Nationalism," p. 25.

On the one hand, modernity brings with it not only the world's fastest trains and largest department stores but the problems inherent in an industrial society; the elderly, welfare, youth rebellion. Ango Sakaguchi, a young writer wrote an essay in 1942 entitled, "A Personal View of Japanese Culture." He began by quoting foreigners extolling the beauty of "traditional" Japan and lamenting modern vulgarity; he countered by saying,

What is tradition? What is national character? Is there something inherent in our character that gave the Japanese a definite predisposition to invent and wear the kimono?. . . Most Japanese, when they see the old look of their native places destroyed and new Western-style buildings appear, are happy, not sad . . . As long as there is life, our distinctive character will remain in good shape.¹¹⁴

This distinctive character, the "we Japaneseness" continues to run parallel and includes the traditions of the living treasures, cherry blossom viewing, vertical social structure, and the family. Former Prime Minister Nakasone, himself, was the epitome of this. To the world, he was the "internationalist" and modern statesman, but at home, he was the "Yamatoist."

Most importantly, as defined in the peace constitution, the emperor continues to represent the unity of the Japanese people. In his exemplary family life and with his diligence and unassuming manner, Hirohito came to represent to many

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Ibid.

Japanese the best qualities of the Japanese people themselves.

As for Emperor Akihito, his father's death is one of the most important milestones in Japan since the end of World War II because it brings to a close the monarchy's connection to militarism. Although, Emperor Akihito's preference for an open, democratic and pacifistic monarchy is well-known, his future role, including how close he will be to his subjects, will be determined by the Imperial Household Agency, which traditionally has managed the emperor's affairs. The agency has tremendous influence over the public face of the monarchy; it even controls all the money of the imperial family. A very real possibility is that nationalist forces within Japan today will try to heighten the symbolic power of the emperor to bring it more in line with Japan's larger world role.¹¹⁵

In concluding, the Japanese have retained their spirit of "we Japanese," although somewhat unstructured, it is nevertheless there. The traditional social framework running parallel to Japan's modern role in the world remains a vital part of Japanese life, of which nationalism is a crucial element. What remains is for the Japanese themselves to redefine and harness this spirit.

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Horvat, "Essence of an Era," pp. 34-35.

A. NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES

The United States should not forcefully pressure the Japanese to open their markets because historical precedence has demonstrated that when the Japanese feel pressured or forced, they revert to the "we against the world" mentality. Their countermeasure for perceived foreign intervention in matters of Japanese sovereignty is a more congealed national polity:

When national soul becomes a tool of political propaganda in Japan, it is time for the rest of the world to take note, especially when steadily worsening trade conflicts and American threats of protectionism could easily provoke an emotional swing of the old Japanese pendulum, from emulation to rejection of the West. . . . the feelings of Japan being misunderstood and unfairly treated by the rest of the world are widely held and already impinge on international trade.¹¹⁶

Former U.S. ambassador to Japan Edwin Reischauer once made the statement, "US-Japanese relations should not be taken for granted"; from a Japanese perspective, there are two critical areas in our relationship, foreign trade and security.

It is over rice that one of the strongest Japanese reactions to foreign pressure can be seen. Almost no rice can be imported because it has been said that "rice is the core of Japan's spiritual civilization."¹¹⁷ And harsh,

¹¹⁶

Murray Sayle, "Success Turns Sour," Far East Economic Review, (30 April 1987): 60.

¹¹⁷

Charles Smith, "A Sticky Situation," Far East Economic Review, (29 September 1988): 34.

protective measures on the part of the U.S. simply confirms all the paranoia over "us against them." It is not in our own best trade or security interests to force either our democratic ideology or trade policy on areas that could influence Japanese sovereignty.

Disputes with the U.S. over burden sharing, feelings of nationalism which these disputes heightened, and fear of increased vulnerability to Soviet nuclear attack have contributed to a growing consensus in Japan to "go it alone." The US-Japan security treaty, constitutional amendments and the weapons export policy are all current policy and their utility is valid only as long as they continue to serve their national interest. We have already seen an indication of this in the disclosure in 1987 that Toshiba Corporation had sold eight computer-guided multiaxis milling machines to the Soviet Union, enabling the Soviets to mass produce a more silent propellor for their submarines. This was in direct violation of COCOM (Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls) rules. The incident not only damaged the U.S. defense effort but also sparked the fear that Japan could not be trusted in defense matters.

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Gregory P. Corning, "U.S.-Japan Security Cooperation in the 1990s," Asian Survey, vol XXIX, 1 (January 1989): 269.

Additionally, if we encourage Japan's defense buildup as an extension of US national interest, we could be contributing to a rearmed Japan which could eventually be used according to their own "agenda." In fact, the emergence of Japan as a competitor to the American and European arms industries is a real possibility. Japan could well accelerate the buildup of its own defense production capabilities outside U.S. controls.¹¹⁹ Presently, the defense industry is growing, mainly due to increasing use of electronics in weapons systems. Approximately 80 percent, including all electronics, of the FSX, Japan's new support fighter,¹²⁰ will comprise indigenous Japanese technology.

If trade and security relations with the U.S. become strained enough, Japan may thrust towards economic disengagement and autonomous defense. The Bush administration will have to constructively address the trade and security issues of the U.S.-Japan relationship. The present Japan-bashing approach¹²¹ currently popular in Congress views Japan as the source of the problem in the bilateral relationship. These individuals call for a U.S. protectionist trade policy coupled with a Japanese defense buildup.

¹¹⁹

Ibid., pp. 278-281.

¹²⁰

Ibid.

¹²¹

Phrase used by Gregory P. Corning in "U.S.-Japan Security Cooperation in the 1990s," Asian Survey.

Japan-bashers alienate Japan with this approach. A 1987 New York Times-CBS-Tokyo Broadcasting System poll taken a few months after the first Reagan administration trade sanctions illustrates this point. According to the poll, 55 percent of Japanese surveyed believed relations with the U.S. were unfriendly, and 77 percent felt the U.S. was blaming Japan for American economic problems.¹²²

The Reagan administration basically held a "rudderless course" reacting to waves of protectionist sentiment. There was a definite absence of a consistent strategy in the U.S.-Japan relationship. This resulted in the U.S. reacting to major negative developments, such as the Toshiba sale, in a retaliatory manner. The end result produced and will continue to produce resentment in Japan, blocking future possibilities for change.

In the final analysis, Japan has amply demonstrated an industrial strength and financial sufficiency to make an autonomous course possible. If U.S. bilateral policy remains devoid of cultural sensitivity to Japan, we may force Japan to exercise its options in unilateral defense buildup and trade preferences. At no point since the end of World War II has Japan been more able or willing to "do it alone."

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Corning, "U.S.-Japan Security Cooperation in the 1990s," pp. 268-269.

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